|
|
作者 | Ray Dalio
来源 | 财经会议圈
编辑 | 杨兰
审核 | 浦电路交易员
8月22日，桥水基金创始人瑞·达利欧（Ray Dalio）在个人 Substack 上发表长文《国家如何走向破产：当下变局背后的内在逻辑》，为他的新著《国家如何破产：大周期》写了一篇“现实对照版”导读。
先说作者的分量。达利欧执掌的桥水是全球最大对冲基金，他本人在全球宏观市场搏杀五十多年，押注主权债务的时间几乎一样长。2008年金融危机、随后的欧债危机，他都提前看见并全身而退。《原则》让他出了圈，而这一次，他把过去秘而不宣的债务诊断方法完整公开，理由只有一句：“它太重要，不该只留给自己。”
再说时机，这篇文章几乎是踩着盘面写出来的。
它发表的同一周：
美国联邦债务总额刚刚突破40万亿美元，从30万亿到40万亿只用了不到五年；
30年期美债收益率冲上5.3%，创2007年以来新高，10年期一度突破4.7%；
日本抛售美债、把资金汇回国内支撑日元；
8月19日，美国财政部紧急宣布将长期国债回购规模至少翻倍，长债收益率应声回落，美元指数跌至三个月新低，黄金单日暴涨超4%，一举突破4500美元。
三件事同时发生，很多人跑去问达利欧：
这符合你书里的模板吗？他的回答是：完全符合。
核心结论是什么？
一句话：当债务供给大到需求接不住，结局只有两条路，要么利率飙升、拖垮市场和经济，要么央行印钞买债、让货币贬值，两条路都通向债券的糟糕回报，最终汇成一场“债务诱发的经济心梗”。
他给出三个可以实时盯住的指标：
政府偿债相对收入的规模、债务抛售相对需求的规模、央行印钞购债的规模。
用这三把尺子量今天的美国：
年收入5.5万亿美元，支出7.5万亿，存量债务约32万亿，每年必须支付的本息高达11万亿，相当于流入资金的200%。
他的预测直白得近乎残酷：
不改变航线，危机将在三年内到来，上下浮动两年。解药则是他反复讲的“3%三管齐下”：把赤字压到GDP的3%，减支、增税、降息三手同步，趁体系还强健时动手术，而不是等它虚弱。
重点摘句：
“一切货币秩序都曾崩塌，我描述的债务周期过程正是这些崩塌背后的推手。”
“货币和债务必须是有效的财富储藏手段，否则就会被贬值、被抛弃。”
“危机爆发的时刻，就是债务融资支撑的支出被掐紧的时刻，如同一场债务诱发的经济心梗。”
“这就像动脉里斑块很多、照常吃高脂食物又不锻炼的人对医生说：你早就警告过我，可我不是还没心梗吗？凭什么现在要我信你？”
“这场手术尤其要趁体系还相对强健时做，而不是等它虚弱时再做。”
这篇文章是《国家如何破产：大周期》最浓缩的五分钟版本：机制、数据、预测、方案、资产配置建议一应俱全。达利欧给投资者的最后忠告是低配债券、超配黄金和少量比特币，把10%到15%的资金放在黄金上。在40万亿美元债务与4500美元金价同时成为现实的今天，这份模板值得逐字读完。全文如下。
瑞·达利欧发布于 2026 年 8 月 21 日
在我的著作《国家如何破产：大周期》中，我给出了一个详尽的模板，描述债务供需失衡到不可持续时，大概率会引发怎样的动态演化。
最近三件事同时发生：
一、日本政府出售部分美债持仓，把资金汇回国内，用以支撑日元和日本资本市场，同时在不大幅加息的前提下降低对美债的敞口；
二、美债收益率在长端带领下升至新高，同时美元走弱，原因是当前和未来债务供给巨大而需求正在减弱；
三、本周财政部长贝森特宣布美国财政部将回购美国国债，而他能动用的回购能力其实非常有限。
很多人问我，这些事件是否与我书中阐述的经典模板相符。
答案是肯定的。要想预判接下来可能发生什么，值得重温这个模板。
在书中，我详细阐述了政府的债务与货币重组过程通常如何推进。我还给出了预测，展示新增债务和到期滚续债务的供给与需求之间不断扩大的失衡，可以拿来对照现实、帮助预判未来。如果你是市场参与者，需要吃透这个模板来把握交易时机，我建议你读完整本书；如果你不想要那么多细节，或者不想花时间，可以读下面这段关于运行机制的五分钟速览。
运行机制是怎样的
中央政府的债务动态与个人或公司是一样的，区别在于中央政府拥有一家可以印钞的央行（印钞会让货币贬值），还可以通过征税从人们手里拿钱。
因此，你只需想象：如果你自己或你经营的企业既能印钞、又能向别人征税，你的债务动态会怎样运转，你就能理解这套机制。但请记住，你的目标是让整个系统运转良好，不只是为你自己，而是为所有公民。
在我看来，信用与市场体系就像人体的循环系统，把养分输送到构成市场和经济的身体各部分。如果信用被有效使用，就能创造生产率和收入，足以偿还债务本金和利息，这是健康的。
但如果使用不当，产生的收入不足以还本付息，债务偿付就会像斑块一样堆积，挤占其他支出。当债务偿付规模变得非常大，就会形成债务偿付问题，最终演变成债务滚续问题，因为债权人不愿再滚续，只想卖出。自然，这会造成债券等债务工具的需求短缺和抛售。
当需求相对于供给短缺时，要么 a) 利率上升，把市场和经济拖低；要么 b) 央行“印钞”购债，这会降低货币价值，把通胀推高到本不会有的水平。
印钞还会人为压低利率，损害债权人的回报。两条路都不好。当债务抛售大到无法遏制、利率上升，而央行已买入大量债券时，央行就会亏损，现金流受损。如果继续下去，央行会出现负净资产。
当情况变得严重时，中央政府和央行都要靠借钱来支付债务本息；由于自由市场需求不足，央行印钞提供融资，于是一个自我强化的“债务、印钞、通胀”螺旋就此形成。
概括起来，需要盯住的经典指标有三个：
政府债务偿付相对于政府收入的规模（相当于循环系统里斑块的数量）；
政府债务的抛售量相对于需求量的规模（相当于斑块脱落、引发心梗）；
央行为弥补国债供需缺口而印钞购债的规模（相当于央行开出大剂量的流动性与信贷来缓解流动性短缺，由此制造出更多债务，而央行自身就暴露在这些债务上）。
这些指标通常会在一个长达数十年的周期里持续上升，债务和债务偿付相对于收入不断攀升，直到无以为继，因为：
1) 债务偿付支出对其他支出的挤占到了不可接受的程度；
2) 必须被买下的债务供给相对购买需求太大，利率不得不大幅上升，把市场和经济重重打下去；或者
3) 为了不让利率上升、避免市场和经济双输的结局，央行大举印钞、大量买入国债以弥补需求缺口，使货币价值大幅走低。
无论走哪条路，债券的回报都会很糟，直到货币和债务最终便宜到足以吸引需求，或者政府能以低廉成本回购或重组债务为止。
这就是大债务周期最浓缩的样子。
因为这些都可以量化，所以人们可以实时监测这套债务动态，很容易看到问题正在逼近。我在投资中一直使用这套诊断方法，过去秘而不宣，但现在我在《国家如何破产：大周期》中把它详细讲了出来，因为它太重要，不该只留给自己。
更具体地说，你会看到：
债务和债务偿付相对收入不断上升；债务供给大于需求；
央行先是降息刺激，随后印钞购债来应对；
最终央行亏损、出现负净资产；
中央政府为支付债务本息而背负更多债务，央行则把债务货币化。
所有这些都指向政府债务危机，其效果相当于一次经济心梗：
当债务融资支撑的支出被掐紧，经济循环系统的正常血流就会中断。
在大债务周期最后阶段的早期，市场走势会这样反映这套机制：
利率上升且由长端领涨；
货币贬值，尤其相对黄金贬值；
中央政府财政部门因长债需求不足而缩短发债期限。
通常在这套机制最严重的过程后期，还会出台一些看似极端的措施，比如实施资本管制、对债权人施加非常大的压力要求其买入而不卖出债务。我的书中对这套机制有完整得多的解释，并附有大量图表和数据加以展示。
美国政府现状速览
现在，想象你在经营一家叫“美国政府”的大企业。这个视角能帮你理解美国政府的财政状况及其领导层的抉择。
今年总收入约为 5.5 万亿美元，总支出约为 7.5 万亿美元，因此预算缺口约 2 万亿美元。
也就是说，今年你这个组织的支出比收入高出约 40%。
而且几乎没有压缩开支的空间，因为几乎所有支出要么早已承诺，要么属于必需开支。由于你的组织长期大量举债，已经累积了一笔巨额债务，约为每年收入的 6 倍（约 32 万亿美元[1]），摊到每户家庭头上约 24 万美元，都需要你来兜底。
这笔债务的利息账单约为 1 万亿美元，约占你这家企业收入的 20%，也相当于今年预算缺口（赤字）的一半，而这个缺口还得靠借钱来填。
但你要付给债权人的远不止这 1 万亿美元，因为除了利息，你还要偿还到期本金，约 10 万亿美元。你只能指望债权人愿意再借给你。所以，债务偿付总额，也就是为避免违约必须支付的本金加利息，约为 11 万亿美元，约相当于流入资金的 200%。
这就是当前的状况。
那么，接下来会怎样？我们来推演一下。
无论赤字最终是多少，你都得借钱来填。关于赤字会有多大，争论很多。把最近通过的预算协调法案考虑进去，多数独立评估机构预计，10 年后债务将达到 55 万亿至 60 万亿美元（约为收入的 7 倍），因为还要新增 25 万亿至 30 万亿美元的借款。
当然，10 年后，如果没有应对方案，这个组织将面对更多债务偿付对其他支出的挤占，以及更大的风险：它要卖的债，市场未必有足够需求来接。
[1] 联邦政府债务为 32 万亿美元，不含政府间持有部分；若计入，联邦债务总额约为 40 万亿美元。
我的“3% 三管齐下”方案
我确信，美国政府的财政状况正处于拐点。如果现在不处理，债务将累积到不造成巨大创伤就无法管理的程度；而且这场手术尤其要趁体系还相对强健时做，而不是等它虚弱时再做。原因在于，一旦经济陷入收缩，政府的融资需求会大幅增加。
根据我的分析，我认为必须采用我所说的“3% 三管齐下”方案来处理。也就是把预算赤字压到 GDP 的 3%，同时均衡使用三种减赤手段：
一、削减支出；二、提高税收收入；三、降低利率。
三者必须同步推进，避免任何一项用力过猛，因为任何一项过度都会让调整过程充满创伤。而且这些调整必须通过良性的基本面调整来实现，不能靠强压（例如，如果美联储被人为地强压降息，后果会非常糟糕）。
根据我的测算，相对当前规划，支出削减和税收增收各约 5%，利率相应下降约 1 至 1.5 个百分点，将使未来十年的利息支出降低 GDP 的 1 至 2 个百分点，并刺激资产价格和经济活动上行，带来多得多的收入。
一些常见问题与我的回答
书中还有篇幅所限无法展开的内容，包括对驱动世界一切重大变化的“整体大周期”（由债务、信用、货币周期，内部政治周期，外部地缘周期，自然灾害，以及技术进步构成）的描述、我对未来图景的思考，以及变革时期的一些投资视角。眼下，我先回答在谈这本书时被问到的一些常见问题；想深入了解的话，欢迎去读全书。
问 1：为什么会发生大型政府债务危机和大债务周期？
大型政府债务危机和大债务周期的发生，可以很容易地用三个指标衡量：
1) 政府债务偿付相对政府收入上升到不可接受地挤占必需政府支出的程度；
2) 政府债务的抛售量相对需求量过大，于是利率上升，拖累市场和经济下滑；
3) 央行以降低利率应对，这又降低了债券需求，进而导致央行印钞购买国债，使货币贬值。
这些通常会在一个长达数十年的周期里不断加剧，直到无以为继，因为：
1) 债务偿付支出不可接受地挤占其他支出；
2) 必须被买下的债务供给相对购买需求太大，利率不得不大幅上升，重创市场和经济；
或 3) 央行大举印钞购债弥补需求缺口，使货币价值大幅走低。
无论哪种情形，债券回报都很糟，直到便宜到足以吸引需求，或者债务可以被重组为止。这些都可以轻易测量，也都能看到它们正在滑向一场迫近的债务危机。危机爆发的时刻，就是债务融资支出被掐紧的时刻，如同一场债务诱发的经济心梗。
纵观历史，这类债务周期几乎在每个国家都发生过，通常还不止一次，因此确实有数百个历史案例可供研究，最远可溯及有文字记载的历史。换句话说，一切货币秩序都曾崩塌，而我描述的债务周期过程正是这些崩塌背后的推手。正是这个过程导致所有储备货币的解体，比如英镑，以及英镑之前的荷兰盾。我的书中展示了最近的 35 个案例。
问 2：如果这个过程反复发生，为什么其背后的机制没有被充分理解？
你说得对，这个过程确实没有被充分理解。有意思的是，我找不到任何研究它如何发生的文献。我的推测是：它不被理解，是因为在储备货币国家，货币秩序的崩塌通常一辈子才发生一次；而当它发生在非储备货币国家时，人们又假定那是储备货币国家可以免疫的问题。我之所以发现这个过程，唯一的原因是我在主权债券投资中亲眼看到它发生，于是研究了历史上的大量案例，以便妥善应对（比如应对 2008 年全球金融危机和随后的欧洲债务危机）。
问 3：在等待美债问题爆雷的过程中，我们到底该多担心一场“心梗式”债务危机？人们听过太多“狼来了”却迟迟未至的警告。这次凭什么不同？
基于前述种种状况，我认为我们应该非常担心。那些以前在状况还没这么严重时就担心债务危机的人，当时的担心是对的，因为更早处理本可以防止病情恶化到今天这个地步，就像医生早早就警告不要吸烟、不要胡吃海塞。所以我推测，这个问题之所以没有引发更广泛的担忧，既因为人们对它理解不够，也因为过早的警告滋生了不少麻痹心态。这就像动脉里斑块很多、照常吃高脂食物又不锻炼的人对医生说：“你早就警告过我，不改掉这些习惯就会出事，可我不是还没心梗吗？凭什么现在要我信你？”
问 4：今天美国债务危机的催化剂可能是什么？何时发生？这样的危机长什么样？
催化剂将是前述各种因素的汇合。至于时点，会因政策和外生因素而提前或推迟，比如重大政治变局和战争。举例来说，如果预算赤字能从我和多数人所预测的约 GDP 的 7% 降到 3% 左右，风险就会大大降低。如果出现大的外生冲击，危机就会来得更早；如果没有，就会来得更晚，或者（如果管理得当）根本不发生。我的猜测，估计会是个不准的猜测是：如果不改变现行路线，危机将在三年内到来，上下浮动两年。
问 5：你知道有没有类似案例，按你说的方式大幅削减赤字并且结果良好？
有，我知道好几个。我的方案将把预算赤字削减约 GDP 的 4%。最类似且结局良好的案例发生在美国 1991 至 1998 年间，当时预算赤字削减了 GDP 的 5%。我的书中还列出了发生在其他国家的若干类似案例。
问 6：有人认为，由于美元在全球经济中的主导地位，美国总体上更不容易受债务问题与危机的冲击。你认为持这种观点的人遗漏或低估了什么？
如果他们真这么想，他们缺的是对机制和历史教训的理解。更具体地说，他们应当去研究历史，弄清楚此前所有储备货币为什么不再是储备货币。一句话说透：货币和债务必须是有效的财富储藏手段，否则就会被贬值、被抛弃。我描述的这套机制，解释的正是储备货币如何丧失其财富储藏功能。
问 7：日本的债务与 GDP 之比高达 215%，在发达经济体中最高，常被当作“一个国家可以长期背着高债务而不爆发债务危机”的样板。为什么日本的经验不能让你安心？
日本案例恰恰印证、并将继续印证我描述的问题，它是我理论的活样本。更具体地说，正因为日本政府过度负债，日本债券和债务一直是糟糕的投资。为了在国家可承受的低利率下弥补日本债务资产的需求缺口，日本央行大量印钞、大量买入国债，结果是：自 2013 年以来，持有日本债券相对持有美元债务亏损 51%，相对持有黄金亏损 76%。以统一货币口径计算，日本普通劳动者的工资自 2013 年以来相对美国劳动者下降了 55%。我的书里有一整章专门深入分析日本案例。
问 8：世界上还有哪些地区从财政角度看问题特别严重、却可能被人们低估？
多数经济体都有类似的债务和赤字问题。英国、欧盟、中国和日本都是。所以我预计多数经济体都会经历类似的债务与货币贬值调整过程，这也正是我预计黄金和比特币这类非政府发行的货币会相对表现更好的原因。
问 9：投资者应如何应对这种风险、未来该如何布局？
总的建议是：在资产类别和国家上充分分散，选择那些收支状况和资产负债表强健、且没有严重内部政治冲突和外部地缘冲突的标的；低配债券等债务类资产；超配黄金和少量比特币。把一小部分资金，比如 10% 到 15%，配置在黄金上，可以降低组合的风险，而且我认为这还有可能提高组合的回报。
一、英文原文（English Original）
How Countries Go Broke: The Dynamic Behind What is Happening Now
Ray DalioPublished Aug 21, 2026
In my book How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle, I laid out a detailed template describing the dynamics of what would likely happen as a result of unsustainable imbalances in the supply and demand for debt. The recent confluence of three events—1) the Japanese government selling some of thEIr U.S. bond holdings to repatriate funds to Japan to support the yen and Japanese capital markets and lessen exposure to US Treasuries without having to raise interest rates more than they would like to support the yen, 2) U.S. bond yields rising to new highs led by the long end, accompanied by dollar weakness, due to both huge current and prospective debt supply and weakening demand for it, and 3) this week's announcement by Treasury Secretary Bessent that the U.S. Treasury will buy U.S. Treasury bonds, which he has only limited capacity to do—has led many people to ask me if these events are consistent with the classic template outlined in my book. The answer is yes. To anticipate what is likely to happen, it is worth reflecting on that template.
In the book, I laid out in detail how this debt/money restructuring process typically progresses for governments. I also gave projections to show the imbalance between the increasing supply of new debt and debt rollovers and the demand for them, which can be used as a template to compare against what is actually happening and help anticipate the future. If you're a market participant who needs to understand that template in detail to market-time your moves, I recommend that you read the whole book, while if you don't want that level of detail or don't care to spend the time, you might want to read the following 5-minute summary about how the mechanics work.
How the Mechanics Work
The debt dynamics work the same for a central government as they do for a person or a company, except that a central government has a central bank that can print money (which devalues it) and it can take money away from people via taxes. For these reasons, if you can imagine how the debt dynamics would work for you or a business you run if you could print money or get money from people by taxing them, you can understand the dynamic. But keep in mind that your goal is to make the overall system run well, not just for yourself, but for all citizens.
To me, the credit/market system is like the human circulatory system, bringing nutrients to all parts of the body that make up the markets and economy. If credit is used effectively, it creates productivity and income that can pay back the debt and interest on the debt, which is healthy. However, if it isn't used well so it doesn't produce enough income to pay back the debt and the interest on the debt, debt service will build up like plaque that squeezes out other spending. When debt service payments become very large, that creates a debt service problem and eventually a debt rollover problem as holders of the debt don't want to roll it over and want to sell it. Naturally, that creates a shortage of demand for debt instruments like bonds and the selling of them, and when there is a shortage of demand relative to supply that either leads to a) interest rates rising, which drives markets and the economy lower, or b) the central bank "printing money" and buying debt, which lowers the value of money, which raises inflation from what it would have been. Printing money also artificially lowers interest rates, which hurts the lenders' returns. Neither approach is good. When interest rates rise because the selling of debt becomes too large to curtail and the central bank has bought a lot of bonds, the central bank loses money, which hurts its cash flow. If this continues, it leads to the central bank having a negative net worth.
When this becomes severe, both the central government and the central bank borrow to make debt service payments, the central bank prints money to provide the lending because the free-market demand is inadequate, and a self-reinforcing debt/money printing/inflation spiral ensues.
In summary, the classic things to watch are as follows:
- The amount of government debt service there is relative to government revenue (which is like the amount of plaque in the circulatory system),
- The amount of selling of government debt there is relative to the amount of demand for government debt (which is like the plaque breaking off and causing a heart attack), and
- The amount of central bank printing of money to purchase government debt to make up the shortfall in demand for government debt relative to the supply of government debt that needs to be sold (which is like the central bank administering a heavy dose of liquidity/credit to ease the liquidity shortage, producing more debt, which the central bank has an exposure to).
These all typically increase in a long-term, multidecade cycle of rising debt and debt service payments relative to incomes until that can't continue because 1) debt service expenses unacceptably crowd out other spending, 2) the supply of the debt that has to be bought is so large relative to the demand to buy that debt that interest rates have to rise substantially, which sends the markets and the economy down a lot, or 3) rather than allow interest rates to rise and the bad market/bad economy outcome to happen, the central bank prints a lot of money and buys a lot of government debt to make up for the demand shortfall, which sends the value of money down a lot.
In any case, the bonds have a bad return until the money and the debt eventually become so cheap that they can attract demand and/or the debt can be cheaply bought back or restructured by the government.
That is what the Big Debt Cycle looks like in a tiny nutshell.
Because one can measure these things, one can monitor this debt dynamic happening, so it's easy to see problems approaching. I've used this diagnostic process in my investing and I've kept it to myself, but I'm now explaining it in detail in How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cyclebecause it is too important to keep to myself.
To describe it more specifically, one can see debts and debt service payments rising relative to incomes, the supply of debt being larger than the demand for it, and central banks dealing with these things happening by being stimulative at first by cutting short-term interest rates and then by printing money and buying debt, and eventually the central bank losing money and then having a negative net worth, and both the central government taking on more debt to pay the debt service and the central bank monetizing the debt. All these things lead toward a government debt crisis, which produces the equivalent of an economic heart attack that comes when the constriction of debt-financed spending shuts down the normal flow of the economic circulatory system.
Early in the final stage of the Big Debt Cycle, the market action reflects this dynamic via interest rates rising led by long-term rates, the currency declining especially relative to gold, and the central government's treasury department shortening the maturities of its debt offerings because of a shortage of the demand for long-term debt. Typically, late in the process when this dynamic is most severe, a number of other seemingly extreme measures are put into place, like establishing capital controls and exerting extraordinary pressures on creditors to buy and not sell debt. This dynamic is explained much more completely in my book, along with lots of charts and numbers to show it happening.
The US Government's Situation in a Tiny Nutshell
Now, imagine that you are running a big business called the US government. That will give you a perspective that will help you understand the US government's finances and its leadership's choices.
The total revenue this year will be about $5.5 trillion while the total expenses will be about $7.5 trillion, so there will be a budget shortfall of about $2 trillion. So, this year, your organization's spending will be about 40% more than it is taking in. And there is very little ability to cut expenses because almost all the expenses are previously committed to or are essential expenses. Because your organization borrowed a lot over a long time, it has accumulated a big debt—approximately six times the amount that it is bringing in each year (about $32 trillion[1]), which equals about $240,000 per household that you have to take care of.
And the interest bill on the debt will be about $1 trillion, which is about 20% of your enterprise's revenue and half this year's budget shortfall (deficit) that you will have to borrow to fund. But that $1 trillion is not all that you have to give your creditors because, in addition to the interest you have to pay on your debt, you have to pay back the principal that is coming due, which is around $10 trillion. You hope that your creditors will either relend or lend it to you. So, the debt service payments—in other words, the paying back of principal and interest that you have to do to not default—is about $11 trillion, which is about 200% of the money coming in.
That is the current situation.
So, what is going to happen? Let's imagine it. You are going to borrow the money to fund the deficit, whatever that deficit is going to be. There is a lot of argument about what it's going to be. After taking the recently passed budget reconciliation bill into account, most of the independent assessors of the situation project that the debt in 10 years will be $55-60 trillion (which will be about 7 times revenue) because there will be $25-30 trillion of additional borrowing. Of course, in 10 years, that will leave this organization with more debt service payments squeezing out spending and more risk that there won't be enough demand for the debt it has to sell without a plan to deal with this situation.
[1] Federal government debt is $32 trillion excluding intergovernmental holdings. If you were to include these, total federal debt would equal about $40tn.
My 3% 3-Part Solution
I am confident that the government's financial condition is at an inflection point because, if this is not dealt with now, the debts will build up to levels where they can't be managed without great trauma, and it is especially important that this operation happens while the system is relatively strong rather than when it is weak. That is because when the economy is in a contraction, the government's borrowing needs increase a lot.
From my analysis, I believe that this situation needs to be dealt with via what I call my 3% 3-part solution. That would be to get the budget deficit down to 3% of GDP in a way that balances the three ways of reducing the deficit, which are 1) cutting spending, 2) increasing tax revenue, and 3) lowering interest rates. All three need to happen concurrently so as to prevent any one from being too large because, if any one is too large, the adjustment will be traumatic. And these things need to come about through good fundamental adjustments rather than by force (e.g., it would be very bad if the Federal Reserve unnaturally forced interest rates down). Based on my projections, spending cuts and tax revenue increases by about 5% each relative to current planning and interest rates falling by about 1-1.5% in response would lead to interest payments that are lower by 1-2% of GDP over the next decade and would stimulate a rise in asset prices and economic activity that would bring in much more revenue.
Some Commonly Asked Questions and My Answers to Them
There's a lot more in the book than I have the space to get into here, including a description of the "Overall Big Cycle" (consisting of debt/credit/money cycles, internal political cycles, external geopolitical cycles, acts of nature, and advances in technology) that drives all the big changes in the world, my thoughts on what the future likely looks like, and some perspectives on investing during these changes. But for now, I'll answer some of the common questions I've gotten while talking about the book and invite you to check out the full book if you want to go deeper.
Q1: Why do big government debt crises and Big Debt Cycles happen?
Big government debt crises and Big Debt Cycles happen and can easily be measured by 1) the amount of government debt service there is relative to government revenue rising to the point that it unacceptably squeezes out essential government spending, 2) the amount of selling of government debt there is relative to the amount of demand for government debt becoming too large so interest rates rise causing markets and the economy to decline, and 3) the central bank responding to these conditions through lower interest rates, which reduces the demand for the bonds, which then leads the central bank to print money to purchase government debt, which devalues the money. These things typically increase in a long-term, multidecade cycle until they can't continue anymore because 1) debt service expenses unacceptably crowd out other spending, 2) the supply of the debt that has to be bought is so large relative to the demand to buy that debt that interest rates have to rise a lot, which sends the markets and the economy down a lot, or 3) the central bank prints a lot of money and buys a lot of government debt to make up for the demand shortfall, which sends the value of money down a lot. In any case, the bonds have a bad return until they become so cheap that they can attract demand and/or the debt can be restructured. One can easily measure these things and see them moving toward an impending debt crisis. That comes when the constriction of debt-financed spending happens, like a debt-induced economic heart attack.
Throughout history these debt cycles have occurred in virtually every country, typically several times, so there are literally hundreds of historical cases to look at. They go back as far as there is recorded history. Said differently, all monetary orders have broken down and the debt cycle process I'm describing is behind these breakdowns. This is the process that led to the breakdowns of all reserve currencies, like the British pound and the Dutch guilder before the pound. In my book, I show the 35 most recent cases.
Q2: If this process happens repeatedly, why are the dynamics behind it not well-understood?
You're right that the process is not well-understood. Interestingly, I couldn't find any studies about how this happens. I theorize that it is not well-understood because the breakdown of monetary orders typically happens only about once a lifetime in reserve currency countries and when it happens in nonreserve currency countries this process is presumed to be a problem that reserve currency countries are immune to. The only reason I discovered this process is that I saw it happening in my sovereign bond market investing, which led me to study many cases of it happening throughout history so that I could navigate them well (such as navigating the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent European debt crisis.
Q3: How worried should we really be about a "heart attack" debt crisis in the US when waiting for US debt issues to blow up? People have heard a lot about the pending debt crisis that never came. What makes this time different?
I think we should be very worried because of the previously mentioned conditions. I think that those who worried about the debt crisis happening before, when conditions were less severe, were right to worry about it then because addressing it earlier could have prevented the conditions from getting so bad, like a doctor warning early against smoking and eating poorly. So, I theorize that the reason this issue isn't more widely worried about is both because it isn't well enough understood and because there is a lot of complacency that has developed as a result of the premature warnings. It's like someone with a lot of plaque in their arteries who is eating a lot of fatty food and not exercising saying to their doctor, "You've warned me that bad things would happen to me if I didn't change my ways, but I haven't had a heart attack yet. So, why should I believe you now?"
Q4: What could be the catalyst for a US debt crisis today, when will it happen, and what would such a crisis look like?
The catalysts will be a convergence of the previously mentioned influences. As for the timing, it can be hastened or postponed by policies and exogenous factors, like big political shifts and wars. For example, if the budget deficit is lowered to about 3% of GDP from what I and most others project to be about 7% of GDP, that would reduce the risks a lot. If there are big exogenous shocks, it will come earlier, and if there aren't, it will come later or not at all (if it is managed well). My guess, which I suppose will be a bad one, is that it will come in three years, give or take two, if the course we're on is not changed.
Q5: Do you know of any analogous cases of the budget deficit being cut so much in the way you describe and good outcomes happening?
Yes. I know of several. My plan would lead to a cut in the budget deficit of about 4% of GDP. The most analogous case of that happening with a good outcome was in the United States from 1991 to 1998 when the budget deficit was cut by 5% of GDP. In my book, I list several similar cases that happened in other countries.
Q6: Some people have argued that the US is generally less vulnerable to debt-related problems/crises because of the dominant role of the dollar in the global economy. What do you believe those who make that argument are missing/underappreciating?
If they believe this, they are missing an understanding of the mechanics and the lessons of history. More specifically, they should be examining history to understand why all prior reserve currencies stopped being reserve currencies. Stated very simply, currency and debt have to be effective storeholds of wealth or they will be devalued and abandoned. The dynamic I am describing explains how a reserve currency loses its effectiveness as a storehold of wealth.
Q7: Japan—whose 215% debt-to-GDP ratio is the highest of any advanced economy—has often served as the poster child for the argument that a country can live with consistently high debt levels without experiencing a debt crisis. Why don't you take much comfort from Japan's experience?
The Japanese case exemplifies and will continue to exemplify the problem I describe, and it demonstrates my theory in practice. More specifically, because of the high level of the Japanese government's over indebtedness, Japanese bonds and debt have been terrible investments. To make up for a shortage of demand for Japanese debt assets at low enough interest rates to be good for the country, the BoJ printed a lot of money and bought a lot of Japanese government debt, which has led to holders of Japanese bonds having losses of 51% relative to holding US dollar debt since 2013 and losses of 76% relative to holding gold since 2013. The typical wages of a Japanese worker have fallen 55% since 2013 in common currency terms relative to the wages of an American worker. I have a whole chapter on the Japanese case in my book that explains this in depth.
Q8: Are there any other areas of the world that look particularly problematic from a fiscal standpoint that people may be underappreciating?
Most economies have similar debt and deficit problems. The UK, the EU, China, and Japan all do. That is why I expect a similar debt and currency devaluation adjustment process in most economies, which is why I expect non-government-produced monies like gold and Bitcoin to do relatively well.
Q9: How should investors navigate this risk/be positioned going forward?
As general advice, I suggest diversifying well in asset classes and countries that have strong income statements and balance sheets and are not having great internal political and external geopolitical conflicts, underweighting debt assets like bonds, and overweighting gold and a bit of Bitcoin. Having a small percentage—maybe 10-15%—of one's money in gold can reduce a portfolio's risk, and I think it would also raise its return.
免责声明
报告中的信息、意见等均仅供查阅者参考之用，并非作为或被视为实际投资标的交易的建议。投资者应该根据个人投资目标、财务状况和需求来判断是否使用报告之内容，独立做出投资决策并自行承担相应风险。 |
|
发表于 2026-8-26 16:58:40